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PREDICTION,  OPTIMIZATION,  AND LEARNING 
IN REPEATED GAMES 
BY JOHN  H.  NACHBAR1 
Consider  a two-player  discounted  repeated  game in which  each player  optimizes  with 
respect  to a prior  belief about  his opponent's  repeated  game strategy.  One would  like to 
argue  that if beliefs are cautious,  then each player's  best response  will be in the support, 
loosely speaking,  of his opponent's  belief and that, therefore,  players  will learn as the 
game unfolds to predict the continuation  path of play. If this conjecture  were true, a 
convergence  result  due to Kalai  and Lehrer  would  imply  that the continuation  path  of the 
repeated  game  would  asymptotically  resemble  that of a Nash  equilibrium.  One would  thus 
have constructed  a theory in which Nash equilibrium  behavior  is a necessary  long-run 
consequence  of optimization  by cautious  players.  This paper points out an obstacle to 
such a theory.  Loosely  put, in many  repeated  games,  if players  optimize  with respect to 
beliefs that satisfy  a diversity  condition  termed neutrality,  then each player  will choose a 
strategy  that his opponent  was certain  would  not be played. 
KEYWORDS:  Repeated  games,  rational  learning,  Bayesian  learning. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Overview 
A STANDARD  MOTIVATION  FOR  GAME  THEORY'S  emphasis on Nash equilibrium is 
the conjecture  that players will learn to play an equilibrium  if they interact 
repeatedly.  This paper focuses on a particular  model of learning  by optimizing 
players.  In the model considered,  two players  engage in an infinitely  repeated 
discounted game of  complete information. Each chooses a  repeated game 
strategy  that is a best response  to his prior  belief as to his opponent's  repeated 
game strategy.  Rather than assume that prior beliefs are in equilibrium,  one 
would like to argue that if beliefs are cautious then each player  will choose a 
strategy  that is in the support,  loosely speaking,  of his opponent's  belief and 
that, therefore,  players  will learn as the game unfolds to predict the continua- 
tion path of play.  If this conjecture  were true, a convergence  result due to Kalai 
and Lehrer  (1993a),  hereafter  KL, would then imply  that the continuation  path 
of the repeated  game  would  asymptotically  resemble  that of a Nash equilibrium. 
One would thus have constructed  a theory  in which Nash equilibrium  behavior 
is a necessary  long-run  consequence  of optimization  by cautious  players. 
1  This  work  originated  in a conversation  with  Jeroen  Swinkels  while I was a visitor  at The Center 
for Mathematical  Studies  in Economics  and Management  Science, Northwestern  University.  The 
paper  has benefited  from the comments  and suggestions  of a number  of others,  including  Richard 
Boylan, Drew Fudenberg,  Ehud Lehrer, David Levine, Bart Lipman,  Wilhelm Neuefeind, Yaw 
Nyarko,  Bruce Petersen,  Suzanne  Yee, Bill Zame, a co-editor,  and two anonymous  referees. The 
usual caveat applies.  I would like to acknowledge  financial  support  from the Center for Political 
Economy  at Washington  University. 
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This paper  points out an obstacle  to such a theory.  The source of difficulty  is 
that, in many  repeated games, for any given strategy  to be optimal,  the player 
must believe that certain opposing strategies are so unlikely that the player 
could not learn to predict the path of play should one of those strategies,  for 
whatever  reason,  actually  be selected.  This poses no problem  for the existence  of 
Nash equilibrium  but it makes it difficult,  in the context of learning  models, to 
reconcile optimization  with the intuitive  notion of cautious  belief. Loosely put, 
the paper's  central result is that, in many repeated games, if players  optimize 
with respect to beliefs that satisfy a diversity  condition  termed neutrality,  then 
each player  will choose a strategy  that his opponent  was certain  would not be 
played. 
Subsection 1.2 offers a detailed, although still informal, discussion of the 
paper's motivation, results, and underlying  logic. Subsection 1.3 develops a 
concrete example.  Subsection  1.4 comments  on some related literature,  KL in 
particular.  While the results of this paper do not contradict  KL, the results do 
suggest that the interpretation  of KL and related papers requires care. The 
formal exposition begins with Section 2, which covers basic definitions,  and 
concludes  with Section 3, which contains  the paper's  results. 
1.2. An Informal  Exposition 
1.2.1. Prediction 
Recall that in a repeated  game,  a (behavior)  strategy  is a function  from  the set 
of finite histories of the repeated game to the set of probability  distributions 
over actions  in the stage game (the game being repeated).  Thus,  given a t-period 
history h, a strategy  o- tells player i to play ov(h)  in period t + 1, where o-(h) 
may be either a pure stage game action or a mixture  over actions.2  A player's 
prior  belief is a probability  distribution  over his opponent's  strategies. 
A strategy  implicitly  encodes how a player  will behave as he learns from his 
opponent's  past actions. Likewise, a belief records how the player thinks his 
opponent will behave as he (the opponent) learns. This paper will focus on 
players  who learn  via Bayesian  updating  of their prior  beliefs.  The assumption  of 
Bayesian  learning  is satisfied  automatically  if players  optimize.  More precisely,  if 
a player  adheres  to a strategy  that is a best response  to his belief then, after any 
t-period  history  (other than one ruled out by the player's  belief or by his own 
strategy),  the player's  strategy in the continuation  repeated game starting  in 
period t + 1 will be a best response  to his date t + 1 posterior  belief, derived  via 
Bayes's  rule, over opposing  continuation  strategies. 
A player's  belief as to his opponent's  strategy,  together  with knowledge  of his 
own strategy,  induces  a probability  distribution  over paths of play.  A player  will 
2In  this paper,  the term "action"  will always  refer to the stage game while the term "strategy" 
will always  refer to the repeated  game. LEARNING  IN REPEATED  GAMES  277 
be said to  leam to predict the continuation  path of play if, as the game proceeds, 
the distribution  over continuation  paths induced  by the player's  posterior  belief 
grows  close to the distribution  induced  by the actual strategy  profile.  Here, as 
elsewhere, the reader is referred to the formal sections of this paper for a 
precise definition.  Note that if players  randomize  in the continuation  game, the 
actual distribution  over continuation  paths will be nondegenerate;  prediction 
means that players learn this distribution,  not which deterministic  path will 
ultimately  be realized. 
One might think that players  will learn to predict the continuation  path of 
play if each player's  prior  belief is cautious  in the sense of satisfying  some form 
of full support  assumption.  But the set of possible strategies is so large that, 
provided  the opposing  player has at least two actions in the underlying  stage 
game, there is  no belief that would enable a player to learn to predict the 
continuation  path of play  for every  possible  opposing  strategy.3  This observation 
may seem  counterintuitive  since, first, a  best  response always exists in  a 
discounted  repeated  game and, second, a best response  has the property,  noted 
above, that it is consistent with Bayesian learning. The explanation  is that 
learning  in the sense of updating  one's prior need not imply that a player is 
acquiring  the ability  to make accurate  forecasts.  Explicit  examples  where  players 
learn but fail to predict  can be found in Blume and Easley (1995). 
One  response to  this difficulty would be  to  abandon prediction as  too 
burdensome  a requirement  for learning  models. I will have somewhat  more to 
say about this in Subsection  1.4, in the context of the learning  model known  as 
fictitious  play,  but this paper  primarily  considers  an alternate  point of view, one 
implicit  in KL, that prediction  cannot  be lightly  abandoned,  that prediction  may 
even be part of what one means by rational  learning.  If one subscribes  to this 
viewpoint,  then one must explain why the actual path of play happens to be 
included in  the  proper subset of  paths that players can learn to  predict. 
Moreover, since the  ultimate goal is  to  explain equilibration  in  terms of 
3 Informally,  the intuition  is that,  whereas  there are only countably  many  finite  histories  to serve 
as data for a player's  learning,  there are uncountably  many  continuation  strategies.  More formally, 
note that if a player  can learn  to predict  the continuation  path  of play  then, in particular,  the player 
can learn  to predict  (the distribution  over)  play  in the next period.  Let a one-period-ahead  prediction 
rule  be a function  that, for each history,  chooses a probability  distribution  over  the opponent's  stage 
game actions.  The probability  distribution  is the rule's  prediction  for the opponent's  action  in the 
next period. For any one-period-ahead  prediction  rule, whether or not derived via Bayesian 
updating,  there exists an opposing  strategy  that does "the opposite."  For example,  suppose  that in 
the stage game the opponent  has two actions,  Left and Right.  For those repeated  game  histories  in 
which the prediction  rule forecasts "Left with probability  p < 1/2"  in the next period, let the 
strategy  choose  "Left  with  probability  1."  Conversely,  for those histories  in which  the prediction  rule 
forecasts  "Left with probability  p > 1/2" in the next period,  let the strategy  choose "Right  with 
probability  1." This strategy  is well-formed  (in particular,  it is a function  from the set of finite 
histories  of the repeated  game to the set of probability  distributions  over stage game actions)  and 
against  this strategy  the prediction  rule always  gets the probability  wrong  by at least 1/2. Since the 
prediction  rule was arbitrary,  it follows that there is no one-period-ahead  prediction  rule that is 
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repeated interaction,  one wants to explain  prediction  without imposing  equilib- 
rium-like  restrictions  on prior  beliefs.4 
1.2.2. Conventional  Strategies 
The approach  proposed  here is to suppose that, associated  with each player, 
there is a subset of repeated game strategies.  For want of a better term, I will 
refer to such strategies as conventional.  I will offer some possible examples 
below. Players  are assumed  to have a slight (e.g., lexicographic)  preference  for 
conventional  strategies.  Thus, a player will choose a conventional  strategy  if 
there is one that is a best response (in the standard  sense of maximizing  the 
expected present value of the player's  stage game payoffs).  If no conventional 
strategy  is a best response,  a player  will optimize  by choosing  a nonconventional 
best response.  For the moment,  I put aside the possibility  that players  might  be 
constrained  to play conventional  strategies. 
Suppose  that the following  properties  hold whenever  each player's  belief is, in 
some appropriate  sense, cautious. 
-1.  Conventional  Prediction.  For any profile of conventional  strategies, each 
player,  via Bayesian  updating  of his prior  belief, learns to predict  the continua- 
tion path of play.5 
2. Conventional  Optimization.  For each player  there is a conventional  strategy 
that is a best response. 
Then, if beliefs are cautious,  Conventional  Optimization  and the maintained 
interpretation  of  conventionality  imply that each player, in choosing a best 
response,  will choose a conventionLal  strategy.  Since both players  play a conven- 
tional strategy,  Conventional  Prediction  implies that each plAyer  will learn to 
predict  the continuation  path of play. Thus players  both optimize  and learn to 
predict  the path of play and hence the KL convergence  theorem  implies  that the 
path of play  will asymptotically  resemble  that of a Nash equilibrium. 
While Conventional  Prediction  and Conventional  Optimization  hold trivially 
if the product  set of conventional  strategies  consists of a single repeated  game 
Nash equilibrium  profile,  such a conventional  set assumes  away  the problem  of 
equilibration.  To satisfy the objective  of not imposing  equilibrium-like  restric- 
tions on prior  beliefs, one wants  beliefs to be cautious  not only in the sense that 
beliefs satisfy some form of full support  condition  with respect to the conven- 
4 This  is in contrast  to the literature  on learning  within  (Bayesian)  equilibrium;  see Jordan  (1991). 
In that literature,  unlike here, players  have incomplete  information  about each other's payoffs, 
which  makes  learning  nontrivial  even when equilibrium  is assumed. 
S Thus, each player  learns to predict the path of play regardless  of which strategy  he selects. 
Weakening  the definition  of Conventional  Prediction  would  require  constructing  a model in which 
both a player's  strategy  choice  and the set of paths  of play  that  he can predict  are determined  jointly. 
There is a danger  in such a model of inadvertently  assuming  away  the problem  of equilibration.  In 
any event,  KL attempts  to finesse  constructing  such a model and I will attempt  to do so as well. LEARNING  IN  REPEATED  GAMES  279 
tional strategies but also in the sense that the conventional  strategy  sets are 
themselves  neutral  with respect to equilibration. 
In this paper,  neutrality  will mean that the map,  call it I,  that assigns  product 
sets of conventional  strategies  to games satisfies the following  properties  (the 
formal  definition  is in Section 3.1). 
1.  !  depends  only on the stage  game's  strategic  form. In particular, !  ignores 
both stage game payoffs and the discount  factor. As I will discuss below, this 
does not imply  that player beliefs  ignore payoff information.  One might argue 
that I  should  take into account  payoff  information  at least in order  to rule out 
nonrationalizable  strategies.  Doing so would somewhat  restrict  the scope of the 
paper's  main Theorem  without  fundamentally  changing  the analysis.  In many  of 
the repeated  games considered  below,  including  all of the games based on 2 X 2 
stage games, all strategies  are rationalizable. 
2.  1  is symmetric.  In particular, I  satisfies player symmetry  and action 
symmetry. 
(a) Player  symmetry  specifies  that if both players  have the same action set in 
the stage game then if some strategy  o- is conventional  for player  1, the strategy 
o-' that is equivalent  to o- from player  2's perspective  must be conventional  for 
player 2. In conjunction  with property  3(b) of neutrality  (see below), player 
symmetry  implies  that if players  have the same action  set, their conventional  sets 
will, in fact, be identical;  see the Claim  established  in the Proof of Proposition  2. 
(b) Action symmetry  implies  that if two possible action sets for player i have 
the same cardinality  then, holding  the opponent's  action  set fixed,  the associated 
conventional  sets for player i are identical  up to a renaming  of his stage game 
actions. 
3.  1  is invariant  to simple  changes  in strategy.  If a strategy  o- is conventional 
for player i, then so is any strategy  o-' that is identical  to 0r except that: 
(a) o-' in effect translates o-'s action choices according  to some function  on 
the set of player i's actions,  or 
(b) o-' in effect translates  input histories  according  to some bijection  on the 
set of action profiles. 
Such  strategy  changes  are simple  in the sense that if o- can be represented  as 
a finite computer  program,  then a program  for o-' can be constructed  merely  by 
adding  a few lines of additional  code to translate  action choices,  input histories, 
or both.6  If invariance  is violated,  then a player  whose forecasts  are persistently 
wrong  may never  notice that his opponent's  behavior  is consistent  with a simple 
variation  on one of the strategies  that the player  could learn to predict.  This sort 
of thick-headedness  runs counter to what one informally  means by a player 
being cautious. 
6Similarly,  if a can be represented  by a finite automaton,  as in Kalai  and Stanford  (1988),  then 
an automaton  for o,f' can be constructed  by straightforward  changes  to the output  function  and the 
transition  rules,  leaving  the set of automaton  states unchanged. 280.  JOHN  H.  NACHBAR 
4.  l  is consistent.  Consider  any pair of stage game action sets, (A1, A2) and 
(A'1,  A' ), Ai cA'1,  where A1 is the action set of player i. Consistency  requires 
the following. 
(a) Suppose  that strategy  o- is conventional  for player i when the action sets 
are (A1, A2). Then o- extends to a strategy  o-' that is conventional  when the 
action sets are (A'1,  A'2) 
(b) Conversely,  suppose  that strategy  o-' is conventional  for player  i when the 
action sets are (A'1,  A'2)  and suppose  further  that o-' restricts  to a well-formed 
strategy o- when the action sets are (A1, A2). Then  o- is conventional  for 
(A1,  A2). 
5.  ' permits pure strategies. More accurately,  for each conventional  nonpure 
strategy,  there should  be at least one pure strategy  in its support  that is likewise 
conventional.7  If a conventional strategy is fully random (that is, after any 
history, it  assigns positive probability  to  each of  the  available stage game 
actions),  this property  means only that some pure strategy  is conventional.  One 
motivation  for this is that a randomizing  strategy  o- for player i is inherently 
more complicated  than some of the pure strategies in its support.  Explicitly, 
given o-, choose some (arbitrary)  ranking  for player i's stage game actions and 
consider  the pure strategy  s that, after any  history  h, chooses the highest  ranked 
action to which o-(h) gives  positive  probability.  For example,  if player  i has only 
two actions, Left and Right (ranked in that order), s  chooses Left after any 
history such that o- randomizes.  For any standard  notion of complexity,  o- is 
more complicated  than s. Indeed, o- uses s as a kind of pattern and adds to s 
the additional  complication  of randomization  after certain  histories.  If one views 
a conventional  strategy set as being built up from less to more complicated 
strategies then, for any conventional  randomizing  strategy  like o-, some pure 
strategy  like s should  be conventional  as well.8 
A product  set of conventional  strategies  is neutral  if there is neutral  map  ' 
such that the product  set is in the image of W. 
Neutrality  is a property  of the conventional  sets rather  than directly  of beliefs. 
For example,  as already  noted, the fact that W ignores payoffs  does not imply 
that each player's  belief ignores payoffs.  Similarly,  players  may have the same 
conventional  set without  their beliefs being identical.  In fact, I require  nothing 
of beliefs other than that players  be able to learn to predict the path of play 
when the strategy  profile  is conventional.  This property  can be satisfied  even if 
beliefs are in many respects quite arbitrary.  For example,  if the set of conven- 
tional strategies  is at most countable,  then it follows from results in KL that 
Conventional  Prediction  will hold provided  only that each player's  belief assigns 
7A pure  strategy  s will be said  to be in the support  of a strategy  a if, after  any  history,  the action 
chosen by s is also chosen  with positive  probability  by a. 
8One  might object that, while players  might not deliberately  favor randomization,  it may be 
impossible  to execute pure strategies  because of "trembling."  Thus, all conventional  strategies 
should be random.  As will be discussed  in Section 3, see in particular  Remark  3 and Remark  8, 
allowing  for slight  trembling  does not materially  affect the argument. LEARNING  IN  REPEATED  GAMES  281 
positive  probability  to each of his opponent's  conventional  strategies,  regardless 
of exactly  how probability  is assigned. 
The prototypical  examples  of neutral,  conventional  sets are those consisting  of 
strategies  that satisfy  some standard  bound  on complexity.  Examples  of such sets 
include the strategies  that are memoryless  (for example,  strategies  of the form, 
"in each period, play Left with probability  p,  Right with probability  1 -p, 
regardless  of the history  of date"),  the strategies  that remember  only at most the 
last r periods,  and the strategies  that can be represented  as a finite flow  chart  or 
program.  It bears repeating  that taking the conventional  set to consist of the 
strategies  that satisfy some complexity  bound does not imply that players are 
constrained to  such strategies or that players are in  any customary sense 
boundedly  rational.  Rather, the implication  is merely that players  have a slight 
preference  for strategies  that are simple. 
This paper  takes the point of view that, while one might  ask a learning  theory 
based on optimization  and caution  to be robust  to deviation  from neutrality,  the 
theory  should not require  such deviation.  For example,  it would be disturbing  if 
the  theory required either player to  view particular  opposing strategies as 
nonconventional  even though those  strategies were computationally  simple 
variants of conventional  strategies. To the extent that the theory requires a 
deviation  from neutrality,  the theory  requires  some degree of equilibration  prior 
to the start of repeated  play. 
1.2.3. The Main Result 
The central result of this paper is the following  Theorem,  stated informally 
here. 
In discounted  repeated  games based on stage games in which neither player 
has a weakly  dominant  action, if players  are sufficiently  impatient  then for any 
neutral conventional  set there is no belief for either player such that Conven- 
tional Prediction  and Conventional  Optimization  both hold. Moreover,  for many 
of these games, including  repeated Matching  Pennies, Rock/Scissors/Paper, 
and Battle of the Sexes, the same conclusion holds for any level of player 
patience. 
As will be discussed in Remark  3 in Section 3.3, the Theorem is robust to 
small deviations  from neutrality. 
The Theorem states that, unless one is willing to violate neutrality,  it is 
impossible  in many  games to formulate  a model of learning  that is closed in the 
sense that Conventional  Optimization  and Conventional  Prediction  both hold 
simultaneously.  In particular,  if the conventional  set is neutral and if Conven- 
tional  Prediction  holds,  then each player,  in the course  of optimizing,  will choose 
a strategy  that is not conventional.  Player beliefs in such a model are naive: 
each player  believes that the other plays  a conventional  strategy  even though,  in 
fact, neither  plays  a conventional  strategy.  Section 1.3 develops  a simple  learning 
model that exhibits  this sort of naivete in a stark fashion. A somewhat  more 282  JOHN  H.  NACHBAR 
sophisticated  example  is provided  by the learning  model known  as fictitious  play, 
discussed in Section 1.4.2. In both examples,  naivete can lead to a failure of 
convergence,  in any reasonable sense, to even approximate  Nash equilibrium 
behavior.  What this naivete means in general for convergence  to Nash equilib- 
rium  behavior  is not known. 
The argument  underlying  the Theorem  runs as follows.  For games of the sort 
described,  for any pure strategy  s for player 1, there are strategies  s' for player 
2 such that, under any such profile (s, s'), player 1 gets a low payoff in every 
period.  For example,  in repeated  Matching  Pennies,  if s' is a best response  to s, 
then under the profile (s, s'),  player 1 gets a payoff of  -1  in each period, 
whereas  his minmax  payoff  is 0 per period.  It follows  that if s is a best response 
to player  l's belief, then it must be that player 1 is convinced  that player  2 will 
not choose s', so convinced  that, if player 1 chooses s, he cannot,  via Bayesian 
updating of his prior, learn to predict the continuation  path of play should 
player  2, for whatever  reason, choose s'. The problem  that arises is that if s is 
conventional  for player  1, then neutrality  implies  that at least one of the s'-type 
strategies  will be conventional  for player  2. Hence, either Conventional  Predic- 
tion or Conventional  Optimization  must fail. 
It might  seem that this argument  depends  in an essential  way on the fact that 
s  was taken to be pure. After all, a player can often avoid doing poorly (in 
particular,  earning  less than his minmax  payoff)  by randomizing.  But not doing 
poorly is not the same thing as optimizing.  In fact, the Theorem extends to 
include conventional  strategy  sets that contain randomizing  strategies.  To see 
this, note that if a nonpure  strategy  is a best response  to some belief, then so is 
every  pure strategy  in its support.9  Suppose  that Conventional  Prediction  holds. 
Since I have assumed  that, for any conventional  nonpure strategy,  some pure 
strategy  in its support  is also conventional,  and since, by the above  argument,  no 
conventional  pure strategy  is optimal,  it follows that no conventional  nonpure 
strategy  can be optimal  either.10 
To make the Theorem somewhat  more concrete, consider  any product  con- 
ventional set consisting  of strategies  that satisfy a bound on complexity.  Stan- 
dard  complexity  bounds  yield neutral conventional  sets that are at most count- 
able. As noted in the discussion of neutrality,  it follows that for any such 
conventional  set there are beliefs for which Conventional  Prediction  holds." To 
be optimal  with respect to such beliefs, a strategy  must be flexible enough to 
make use of the player's  predictive  ability.  Such a strategy  will necessarily  be 
complicated.  In fact, the Theorem implies that a player's  best response will 
9This fact, while standard  for finite games, is less obvious for discounted  infinitely  repeated 
games.  The Appendix  provides  a proof. 
10It  is natural  to ask whether  this negative  result could be overturned  if one allowed  players  to 
have a strict  preference  for randomization  in some circumstances.  This question  will not be pursued 
here since it necessarily  requires  departing  from  standard  subjective  expected  utility  theory. 
It is important  to understand  that prediction,  not countability,  is the central  issue. The same 
argument  would  carry  over to a complexity  bound  that yields an uncountable  set provided  Conven- 
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violate the complexity  bound defining  conventionality.12  Any attempt to obtain 
Conventional Optimization  by adding more complicated strategies into the 
conventional  set is fruitless as long as neutrality is preserved:  adding more 
complicated  strategies  just makes the best response that much more compli- 
cated. The only way to obtain Conventional  Optimization  is to add in so many 
strategies that Conventional  Prediction  is lost. In particular,  if one takes the 
conventional  set to be the set of all strategies  (which  is uncountable),  Conven- 
tional Optimization  holds, but, as argued above, Conventional  Prediction  fails. 
1.2.4. Extensions:  Constrained  and Boundedly  Rational  Players 
Although the primary  focus of this paper is on players  who are rational,  in 
particular,  on players  who have unlimited  ability  to optimize,  it is natural  to ask 
whether  the analysis  would  change  fundamentally  if players  were constrained  in 
some way. 
Suppose  first that each player's  computational  ability  is unrestricted  but that 
the rules of the repeated  game are modified  to require  each player  to choose a 
conventional  strategy.  For example, the conventional  set might consist of the 
strategies  that can be encoded as a finite list of instructions  (a program)  and the 
rules of the game might  require  players  to submit  their strategies  in this form to 
a referee, who then executes the strategies  on behalf of the players. 
Given that players  are constrained,  the Theorem implies that players  will be 
unable to  optimize (assuming that the conventional set is neutral and that 
Conventional  Prediction holds). This is not necessarily a disaster, since one 
might still hope to  find conventional strategies that are approximate  best 
responses.  In order  to apply  convergence  results along the lines of those in KL, 
the  appropriate  version of  approximate  optimization is what will be  called 
uniform  e optimization:  a strategy  is e optimal  if it is e  optimal ex ante and if, 
moreover,  it induces an e  optimal continuation  strategy  in every continuation 
game (more  precisely,  in every  continuation  game that the player  believes  can be 
reached  with positive  probability). 
If the conventional  set consists only of pure strategies, then the argument 
sketched  above extends immediately  to uniform e  optimization.  Therefore,  for 
any neutral conventional  set, if Conventional  Prediction  holds, then Conven- 
tional Uniform e  Optimization  fails for e  sufficiently  small. This need not 
prevent  a player  from choosing  a strategy  that is only ex ante e optimal.  But, as 
illustrated  in Section 1.3, ex ante e  optimization  per se may not be enough to 
guarantee  convergence  to approximate  Nash equilibrium  play. 
12A potential  source of confusion  is that it is well known that many of the possible bounds on 
complexity generate conventional sets with the property that, for any conventional strategy, there is 
a  conventional  best  response.  There  is  no  contradiction  with  the  Theorem  because  this  sort  of 
closure  looks  only  at  beliefs  that  are  degenerate  in  the  sense  of  assigning  all  mass  to  a  single 
strategy.  A  belief  for  which  Conventional  Prediction  holds  for  a  neutral  conventional  set  is 
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If, on the other hand, the conventional  set contains  nonpure  strategies,  then 
the argument  sketched above does not extend. Section 3.4.1 will show that, 
nevertheless,  the first  part of the Theorem,  in which  players  are impatient,  does 
extend for the benchmark  case in which the conventional  set consists of the 
strategies  that can be represented  as a finite program,  even if the program  has 
access to randomizers  (coin tossers). 
Finally,  Section  3.4.2 contains  some remarks  about  players  who are boundedly 
rational,  that is, players  for whom deliberation  is costly. 
1.3.  An Example 
Consider  the game Matching  Pennies, given by: 
H  T 
H  1, -1  -1,1 
T  -1,1  1,9-  1 
For any discount factor, the  unique Nash equilibrium  strategy profile for 
repeated Matching  Pennies calls for both players  to randomize  50:50 in every 
period,  following  any history. 
Suppose that the conventional set,  X  for either player, consists of  three 
strategies:  randomize  50:50, "H always,"  denoted H, and "T always,"  denoted 
T. Thus, X = (50: 50, H, T}. Note that X x X is neutral. 
Assume that each player's  belief assigns probability  one to the set  X and 
positive probability  to each of the three elements of  X. I do not require that 
player  beliefs be equal. It follows from results in KL that, for any such beliefs, 
Conventional  Prediction  holds. Thus, for example,  if Player  2 plays H, Player  1 
will observe  a long initial string  of H's, hence Player  l's posterior  will gradually 
favor the possibility  that Player 2 is playing H, and so Player 1 will come to 
predict  that Player  2 will continue to play H in subsequent  periods. 
Now consider Conventional  Optimization.  Behavior under a best response 
must respond  to the information  learned  over the course of the repeated  game. 
In particular,  if Player 1 learns to predict H, then Player 1 should start  playing 
H in every  period,  while if Player  1 leams to predict  T, he should  start  playing  T 
in every  period.  None of the three strategies  in  X have this sort of flexibility.  As 
a  consequence, Conventional Optimization  fails: none  of  the  conventional 
strategies  is a best response to any belief that gives weight to every strategy  in 
X. If players  optimize,  players  must, therefore, choose nonconventional  strate- 
gies. This model thus exhibits  the sort of naivete discussed  in Section 1.2.3. 
In this example,  the players'  naivete can lead to asymptotic  behavior  that is 
far from  that of a Nash equilibrium.  In particular,  note that one optimal  strategy 
for player  1, arguably  the most obvious  one, is to play H or T in the first  period 
(the choice will depend on player l's prior belief) and then to switch perma- 
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player 2 played T in the first period. A similar  (but mirror  image) strategy  is 
optimal  for player  2. If the players  adopt such pure strategies,  then from  period 
2  onward the  continuation path  will  be  either  ((H,  H),  (H,  H),  ..  . ), 
((H, T), (H, T), ...  ),  ((T, H), (T, H),  ... ),  or  ((T, T), (T, T), ... ),  depending  on 
what happens  in the first  period  (which  in tum depends  on player  beliefs).  None 
of these paths resembles  a likely realization  of the (random)  Nash equilibrium 
path of play." 
Suppose  instead  that, as was discussed  in Section 1.2.4,  players  are constrained 
to  choose from among the three strategies in  L.  For e  low, none of  the 
conventional strategies is  uniformly e  optimal, again because none of  the 
conventional  strategies exploits the fact that the player leams to predict the 
path of play. If each player  chooses a strategy  that is merely ex ante e  optimal, 
rather  than uniformly  e optimal,  then each player  will strictly  prefer  either H or 
T  to 50:50,  depending on his prior belief, unless his prior happens to put 
exactly  equal weight  on H or T. In the latter case, the player  will be indifferent 
between all three strategies.  But, if both players  select pure strategies,  then the 
path of play  will be one of the four discussed  in the previous  paragraph,  none of 
which resembles  a likely realization  of the Nash equilibrium  path of play. 
As this paper's  Theorem  indicates,  the naivete  illustrated  above is not limited 
to  Matching Pennies and in  particular does not  depend on  the  fact that 
Matching Pennies has no pure strategy equilibrium.  Consider, for example, 
perturbing  the stage game to the following: 
H  T 
H  1|  1,  1  |  - 1,- 
T  H  -1  1|  1 
Once again, assume that each player's  belief assigns  probability  one to the set 
=  {50: 50, H, T} and positive probability  to each of the three elements of  X. 
Then no element of X is a best response.  If each player  does indeed optimize, 
either fully or with respect to the constraint  that his strategy  be in X, then the 
possible  continuation  paths from period 2 onward include ((H, T), (H, T), ...) 
and ((T, H), (T, H),  ... ), neither of which is an equilibrium path.14 
The conventional  set  X = {50:  50, H, T} used in the above examples is, of 
course,  extremely  limited.  Section 1.4.2  briefly  discusses  the behavior  of fictitious 
play,  a more satisfactory  learning  model in which X is taken to be the set of all 
memoryless  strategies. 
13 With  probability  1, a realization  of the equilibrium  path  of play  will have  the property  that each 
of  the  four possible  action  profiles (H, H),  (H, T),  (T, H)  and (T, T),  appears with a population 
frequency of 1/4. 
14 In a coordination  game such as this, one  might expect the  players to break out  of  repeated 
miscoordination by finding some direct means of communication. While direct communication might 
be descriptively realistic, appealing to such communication would violate  the objective of trying to 
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1.4.  Remarks  on the Literature 
1.4.1. On Kalai and Lehrer (1993a) 
KL, together with its companion  paper, Kalai and Lehrer (1993b),  does two 
things.  First,  KL provides  a condition  on beliefs that is sufficient  to ensure  that a 
player  learns  to predict  the path of play.  The KL condition  is in the spirit  of (but 
is weaker  than) assuming  that each player  puts positive  prior  probability  on the 
actual strategy  chosen by his opponent.15  Second,  KL establishes  that if players 
optimize  and learn to predict  the path of play, then the path of play asymptoti- 
cally resembles  that of a Nash equilibrium.16 
While the KL sufficient  condition  for prediction  is strong  (from  the discussion 
in Section 1.2.1,  any such condition  must be strong),  it has the attractive  feature 
that it imposes essentially  no restriction  on the player's  belief over strategies 
other than his opponent's  actual  strategy.  It would  thus seem that a construction 
along the lines proposed  above, in which the KL sufficient  condition  is satisfied 
by means of a full support  assumption  with respect  to some set of conventional 
strategies,  ought to work. That this construction  fails stems from the fact that 
the joint requirement  of prediction and optimization  is far more burdensome 
than the requirement  of prediction  alone. This complicates  the interpretation  of 
KL and also of related  papers  such as Kalai  and Lehrer  (1995). 
By way of examyple,  consider again the case of Matching  Pennies with the 
conventional  set  X = {50:  50, H, T}. One would like to argue that the path of 
play  will converge  to that of the unique  Nash equilibrium.  The only  conventional 
strategy  profile for which this occurs is the one in which both players  choose 
50:50. Suppose then that both choose 50:50. The KL sufficient  condition is 
satisfied  provided  only that each player  assigns  positive  probability  to the other 
choosing 50:50. But 50:50 will not be optimal  for a player unless the player 
assigns zero,  not just low, probability  to both H and T.17  In this example,  50:50 
15 The KL prediction  result generalizes  an earlier  theorem  of Blackwell  and Dubins  (1962).  For 
sufficient  conditions  that are weaker  than  the KL  condition,  see Lehrer  and Smorodinsky  (1994)  and 
Sandroni  (1995). 
16 The KL convergence  result  is intuitive  but, for discount  factors  sufficiently  close to 1, it is not 
immediate.  Even  if players  accurately  predict  the continuation  path  of play,  they  can hold erroneous 
beliefs about  what would happen  at information  sets off the path of play.  KL, see also Kalai and 
Lehrer (1993b),  verifies that an equilibrium  with approximately  the same path of play can be 
constructed  by altering  strategies  so as to conform  with  beliefs at unreached  information  sets. When 
there are more  than  two players,  there are additional  complications.  See also Fudenberg  and Levine 
(1993). In the weak (pointwise  convergence)  topology,  convergence  is to the path of a true Nash 
equilibrium.  In the strong  (uniform  convergence)  topology,  KL shows  convergence  only to the path 
of an e-Nash  equilibrium.  See also Sandroni  (1995). 
17As  discussed in  Section 1.3, if  player 1 assigns positive probability  to  every strategy in 
=  (50:  50, H, T) then no conventional  strategy  is optimal.  If player  1 assigns  probability  p E (0, 1) 
to 50:50 and probability  1 -p  to H, then player l's best response  is H, not 50:50. Similarly  if 
player  1 assigns  probability  p to 50: 50 and probability  1 -p  to T, then player  l's best response  is T, 
not 50:50. LEARNING  IN  REPEATED  GAMES  287 
can be optimal  for both players  only if beliefs are actually  in equilibrium  at the 
start of repeated  play. 
1.4.2. Fictitious  Play  and (Semi-) Rational  Learning 
For simplicity,  I focus initially on stage games with two actions for each 
player. 
The classical fictitious play model of  Brown (1951) can be  shown to be 
equivalent  to a model in which each player  optimizes  with respect  to the belief 
that this opponent is playing a memoryless  strategy,  that is, a strategy  of the 
form "in any period, go Left with probability  p, Right with probability  1 -p, 
regardless  of history,"  with p, which  is constant  across  all periods,  drawn  from a 
beta distribution.  See, for example,  Fudenberg  and Levine (1996). The set of 
memoryless  behavior  strategies,  viewed as the conventional  set, is neutral.  One 
can show that Conventional  Prediction  holds (even though beliefs in this case 
violate the KL sufficient  condition).  Hence Conventional  Optimization  must  fail. 
Thus, while players under fictitious play are rational in the sense that each 
chooses a best response to his belief, the beliefs themselves are naive: each 
player believes that his opponent adopts a memoryless  strategy even though 
each, in fact, adopts  a strategy  that is history  dependent. 
Despite this naivete, there are many examples  in which players  under ficti- 
tious play do learn to predict  the continuation  path of play and hence play does 
converge  to that of a Nash equilibrium.  Moreover,  even when prediction  fails, 
play may still exhibit Nash equilibrium-like  behavior. Consider,  for example, 
Matching  Pennies.  Under fictitious  play,  each player  in Matching  Pennies leams 
to believe that his opponent  is randomizing  50:50 even though the actual  path 
of play is typically  nonstochastic.  Thus players  do not leam to predict  the actual 
path of play and the actual  path does not converge,  in the sense used here and 
in KL, to the stochastic path generated by the unique Nash equilibrium  of 
repeated Matching  Pennies. Nevertheless,  both the empirical  marginal  and the 
empirical  joint frequency distributions  of play converge to that of the Nash 
equilibrium  of Matching  Pennies. Thus, behavior  under fictitious  play is consis- 
tent with many (although not all) of the observable  consequences of players 
leaming to play the Nash equilibrium  of Matching  Pennies. 
Unfortunately,  fictitious play is not always  so well behaved. In 2 x 2 stage 
games,  while empirical  marginal  frequency  distributions  of play always  converge 
to a Nash equilibrium  of the stage game, the empirical  joint frequency  distribu- 
tion may  be inconsistent  with Nash equilibrium.  This point has been emphasized 
by Fudenberg  and Kreps (1993), Jordan  (1993), and Young (1993). Moreover, 
there are robust  examples  of stage games with more than two actions,  or more 
than two players,  in which even the empirical  marginal  frequency  distributions 
fail to converge, a point originally  made by Shapley (1962); see also Jordan 
(1993). What is perhaps more disturbing  is that, in the examples in which 
convergence  fails, the path of play cycles  in ways  that are obvious  to the outside 
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These problems  with asymptotic  behavior  under fictitious  play stem from the 
fact that player  beliefs are naive. While the message of this paper is that some 
degree of naivete  may  be unavoidable,  one might  still hope to construct  theories 
of (semi-) rational learning in which players are more sophisticated  than in 
fictitious  play. For recent work along these general lines, see Fudenberg  and 
Levine (1995b),  Fudenberg  and Levine (1995a), Fudenberg  and Levine (1996), 
Aoyagi (1994), and Sonsino (1995). A feature of much of this literature  is that 
players are modeled as using strategies that are intuitively  sensible without 
necessarily  being best responses to well-formed  prior beliefs. Justifying  these 
strategies  as optimal  or near optimal  may require  enriching  the repeated  game 
model or deviating  from standard  decision  theory,  or both. 
1.4.3. Problems  with  Rationality 
Binmore,  in Binmore  (1987) and elsewhere, has warned  that the concept of 
rationality  in game theoxy  may  be vulnerable  to problems  akin  to the unsolvabil- 
ity of the Halting  Problem;  see also Anderlini  (1990). 
Following  Binmore,  view a player  in a one-shot game as choosing a decision 
procedure,  a  function that, taking as input a  description of  the  opponent's 
decision  procedure,  chooses as output an action of the game. This formalism  is 
an attempt  to capture  the idea that a player,  in choosing  his action,  predicts  his 
opponent's  action by thinking  through  the game from his opponent's  perspec- 
tive. Since a player  is assumed  to know his opponent's  decision procedure,  the 
player can predict his opponent's action. The goal is to construct a decision 
procedure  that, for any opposing  decision  procedure,  chooses an action that is a 
best response  to the action chosen by the opponent's  decision  procedure. 
It is not hard to see  that no decision procedure is optimal for Matching 
Pennies.18  Perhaps  more surprisingly,  there may be no optimal  decision proce- 
dure even in games with equilibria  in pure actions. The basic difficulty  is that 
there are so many  possible opposing  decision procedures  that there may be no 
decision procedure that optimizes with respect to  them all. Canning (1992) 
shows  that, for a large  set of games  with equilibria  in pure actions,  one can close 
the  decision problem by limiting players to  domains (subsets) of  decision 
procedures.  Here "close the decision problem"  means that a player finds it 
optimal  to choose a decision  procedure  within the domain  whenever  his oppo- 
nent's decision procedure is likewise within the domain. As Canning (1992) 
emphasizes,  the domains,  while nontrivial,  necessarily  embody  rules of equilib- 
rium  selection. In games with multiple  equilibria,  different  rules of equilibrium 
selection give rise to different  domains. 
18 If players are constrained to play pure actions, the case originally considered in the literature, 
then the existence of an optimal decision procedure would imply the existence of a pure action Nash 
equilibrium, which is false. An argument similar to the one  given in footnote  3 establishes  that no 
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The overlap between this paper and the literature just sketched would appear 
to be small. In this paper, neither player knows the other's decision procedure 
(indeed,  a  player's  decision  procedure  for  choosing  a  strategy  is  not  even 
explicitly modeled),  and neither player knows the other's repeated  game strat- 
egy. Each player merely has a belief as to his opponent's strategy and one would 
like  to  permit each  player's belief  to  be  inaccurate in  the  sense  of  assigning 
considerable probability mass to strategies other than the one  his opponent  is 
actually  playing.  But  while  neither  player  in  the  present  model  may  have 
accurate knowledge of his opponent  ex ante, the insistence on prediction means 
that players will have increasingly accurate knowledge as the game proceeds. If 
the conventional set is neutral, asking for a conventional strategy that is optimal 
when Conventional Prediction holds is akin to asking in Binmore's model for a 
decision procedure that is optimal against all (or at least a large set of) opposing 
decision procedures. Conversely, the  domain restrictions discussed in Canning 
(1992) are suggestive of the deviations from neutrality that would have to obtain 
if Conventional Prediction and Conventional Optimization were to hold simulta- 
neously. 
2.  SOME BACKGROUND ON REPEATED GAMES 
2.1.  Basic Definitions 
Consider a 2-player game  G = (A1, A2, u1, u2), the  stage game, consisting of, 
for each player i,  a finite  action set Ai  and a payoff function ui: A1 x A2 -S  R. 
The stage game is repeated infinitely often. After each period, each player is 
informed of the action profile (al, a2) EA1 xA2  realized in that period. The set 
of  histories of  length  T, AT,  is  the  T-fold Cartesian product of  A1 XA2.  A 
contains  the  single  abstract element  h?, the  null history. The  set  of  all finite 
histories  is  X=  U T 2 oTe  I will sometimes  write ZA1,  A2)  to  emphasize  the 
dependence of t  on (A1, A2). An infinite history, that is, an infinite sequence of 
action profiles, is called a path of play. The set of paths of play is denoted by Z. 
The projection of a path of play z E.2' onto  its period  t coordinate is denoted 
z,.  The projection of  z  onto  its first t  coordinates,  that is, the  t-period initial 
segment of  z, is denoted  i(z,  t); note that  i(z,  t) Er'. 
A (behavior) strategy  for player i is a function  o-: r*-  A(Ai), where  A(Ai)  is 
the set of probability mixtures over Ai.  I will sometimes write vi  to emphasize 
that  the  strategy is  associated  with  player  i.  Let  Xi  be  the  set  of  behavior 
strategies  of  player  i.  I  will  sometimes  write  Xi(A1, A2)  to  emphasize  the 
dependence  of  Xi on (A1, A2). A  pure strategy  for player i is simply a behavior 
strategy that takes values only on the vertices of  A(Ai). Let Si c  Xi be the set of 
pure strategies for Player i. 
Strategy ay  * E Xi will be said to share the support of strategy a-  E  X  iff, for any 
history, h,  if  a*(h)  assigns positive probability to  action  a E Ai,  then  so  does 
ao(h). In the case of a pure strategy, a*  =s,  I will say that  s  is  in the support 
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X1 X  X2 denotes the set of behavior  strategy  profiles  in the repeated  game.  For 
each t, a behavior  strategy  profile  (o-r, o-2) induces  a probability  distribution  over 
cylinders  C(h), where h is a t-period  history  and C(h) is the set of paths of play 
for which the t-period  initial segment equals h. These distributions  can in turn 
be extended  in a natural  way to a distribution  ,  ?2)  over (Z,J),  where -9 is 
the smallest a-algebra  containing  all the subsets formed  by the cylinders;  Kalai 
and Lehrer  (1993a)  discuss  this construction  in somewhat  more detail. 
Fix a discount  factor 8 E [0,1). The payoff  to player i in the repeated  game is 
then given by VK:  Xl x X2 -  R 
V7(r,  o 2)  =  E  tUi(Zt)) 
where E,,(  ,  denotes expectation with respect to  the  induced probability 
A(al,  02), 
2.2. Beliefs 
Player l's  ex ante subjective  belief over player 2's behavior strategies is a 
probability  distribution  over X2. By Kuhn's Theorem (for the repeated game 
version,  see Aumann  (1964)),  any such distribution  is equivalent  (in terms  of the 
induced  distribution  over paths of play) to a behavior  strategy,  and vice versa. 
Thus, following a notational trick introduced  in KL, player l's  belief about 
player  2 can be represented  as a behavior  strategy  a2  E X2; similarly  for player 
2's belief about  Player  1. The profile  of beliefs for both players  is then (o2,  Co2). 
(o,,  a2l) is the profile  consisting  of player l's behavior  strategy  and his belief 
as to player 2's behavior strategy. The histories that player 1 believes are 
possible  are histories h such that  i.(  )  ?7,)(C(h))  > 0. Similar  definitions  hold for 
player 2. 
Suppose that  X2 C:X2 is at most countable (finite or infinite, although my 
notation  will  be  for  the  infinite  case).  Let  21  229  023...  '  *ff2nw  ...  be  an 
enumeration  of  X2. Say that belief a2l  gives weight  to all of  X2 if there is a 
strategy O 203X2  and a  sequence ao, al,...  ..  of  real numbers, with 
ao ? 0, an > 0 for all n > 1, and E= 0an  =  1, such that 
00 
0T21  =  aoo-20  +  E  ano-2n. 
n=1 
Neither Oa20 nor the sequence an need be unique.  A similar  definition  holds for 
player  2. The belief profile  (o2l, ol2)  gives weight to all of  X1 x X2 if o21 gives 
weight  to all Of X2 and cr2 gives weight to all of X1. 
2.3. Continuation  Games 
A  t-period  history h defines a continuation  game, the subgame  beginning  at 
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to be discounted  to date t + 1, rather  than back to date 1. In the continuation 
game following  h, a strategy  o-i induces  a continuation  strategy  oih  via 
oih(hW) =  oi(h -h') 
for any history  h', where h -h' denotes the concatenation  of h and h'. 
With this notation,  a player's  posterior  belief about his opponent's  continua- 
tion strategy has a  simple representation.  If  ,u(ty  ,  )(C(h)) > 0  then, in the 
continuation  game following  h, player  l's posterior  belief,  calculated  in standard 
Bayesian  fashion,  is o2'h;  similarly  for player  2. 
Recalling that i(z,  t) is the history giving the actions chosen in the first t 
periods of the path of play z, we may write 0i.(z  t),  9  (zt),  and O2(z  t). 
2.4. Prediction 
Informally,  if the chosen strategy  profile  is pure, a player  will be said to learn 
to predict the continuation  path of play if, for any number of periods 1, no 
matter  how large,  and any degree of precision q, no matter  how small,  there is a 
time t far enough in the future such that, at any time after t, a player  predicts 
every continuation  history  of length 1 or less with an error  of no more than q. 
The definition  below, in addition  to providing  a formal statement,  extends this 
idea to cases where one or both players  randomize. 
The following definition,  taken from KL, provides a measure of closeness 
between two strategy  profiles  (and hence between the probability  distributions 
over paths of play induced  by those profiles). 
DEFINITON  1: Given strategy profiles (01,  0o2) and (o->, o2*), a real number 
11>  0, and an integer 1  > 0, (o-l, o2) plays  (ii, I)-like (  o-,  o-2*)  iff 
I  /(31,2)(C(h))  -  A(1  0,*)(C(h))I  <  q 
for every  history  h of length 1 or less. 
DEFINMION  2:  Let (0i,  o02)  be the strategy profile chosen by the players and 
let o2- be player  l's belief. Player  1 learns  to predict  the continuation  path of play 
iff the following  conditions  hold: 
1.  /(Lf1  2)(C(h)) > 0 =* A(  1  2)(C(h))  > 0 for any finite history h. 
2. For any real number 1 > 0, any integer 1  > 0, and A(0'1  02)  almost  any path 
of play z, there is a time t(rq,  1,  z) such that if t > t(r, 1,  z), then  (or11f(z,),  U2f(z,,  t)) 
plays (q, 1)-like  (orlw  (z,),  U21w(z,t)).  If (o-1, o2) is pure, then I will write t(q, 1) 
instead of  t(rq,  1,  z). 
The definition  for player  2 is similar. 
REMARK  1: This is weak learning, weak in the  sense that the player is 
required  to make an accurate  prediction  only about  finite continuation  histories, 
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REMARK  2: KL shows that if, instead of (1) in Definition 2,  (0r1,  c2)  and 
(o-l, o-2) satisfy the stronger requirement ,  u2)(E)  > 0 =* A(r21 )(E)  > 0 for 
all measurable  sets of paths E, then part 2 in Definition 2 will be satisfied 
automatically,  and indeed player 1 will be able to make accurate predictions 
even about the tail of the game. If this strengthened  version of part 1 holds, 
then  /L(  (r2)  is said to be absolutely continuous with respect to  ,u(Oyl,i); this is 
the KL sufficient  condition  to which I alluded  in Section 1.4.1. 
An observation  exploited  below is that a sufficient  (but not necessary)  condi- 
tion for absolute  continuity  is that player l's belief satisfies  what KL calls grain 
of truth: r2l satisfies  grain  of truth  iff o2-  =  ao2  +  (1 -  a)o-2,  where o02 is player 
2's  true  behavior  strategy,  o2-  is  some  other  behavior  strategy for  player  2 
(which,  by Kuhn's  Theorem, one may reinterpret  as a probability  distribution 
over behavior  strategies),  and a E [0,1). In the terminology  introduced  above, 
I-2j  satisfies  grain  of truth iff o-2j  gives weight to {o02). 
2.5.  Optimization 
As usual, 01  E X1 is an (ex ante) best response  to belief  or2 E X2 iff for any 
e  E1  V(o-1,  o-) 2 V(  I-,  o-).  For learning  models along the lines considered 
here, one wishes 01  to be not only ex ante optimal  but also dynamically  optimal 
in the following  sense: for any h such that Au(<,  U,2,)(C(h))  > 0 (any h that the 
player  believes  will occur  with positive  probability),  one wishes the continuation 
strategy  ulh  to be a best response  to the continuation  belief co2h.  If o-l satisfies 
this dynamic  optimization  condition,  then write 01  E BR(of,21).  For 8 > 0,  01  E 
BR1(o-21)  if  01  is an ex ante best response  to o21.  If 8 = 0, BRI(o-21)  will (except 
in trivial  cases) be a proper subset of the set of ex ante best responses  to u-2. 
Henceforth,  the term "best response"  for player  1 will be understood  to refer to 
an element of  BR1(o-2).  It is standard  that, for any 8 E [0,1), BR1(cr2j)  #0. 
Similar  definitions  hold for player  2. 
The following  technical  lemma  extends  to discounted  repeated  games a result 
that is well known for finite games. As there does not appear to be a proof 
readily  available  in the literature,  one is provided  in the Appendix. 
LEMMA  S: If  ol e BR1(o21)  and  ol  e X1 shares the support  of  O'J,  then 
a* E BR1(  ro2);  similarly  for Player  2. 
I will also be interested  in approximate  best responses.  Recall that 0i,  is an 
(ex ante) e-best  response  to o2- iff, for any o-r,  V(or1,  o-2)  + e 2 V(o-r,  o21).  Even 
when  8>  0, ex ante optimization  is too weak an optimization  standard  for 
learning models of  the  sort considered here. First, ex ante e  optimization 
imposes  no restriction  on behavior  far out in the repeated  game. Second,  ex ante 
e optimization  may impose little or no restriction  on behavior  along the actual 
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even in the near or medium  term.  I address  these problems  by strengthening  the 
ex ante e optimization  to what will be called uniform e  optimization.19 
DEFINITION 3: ai  eX1  is  a  uniform e-best response to  a21  E  2  written 
al  E BRf(o2l),  iff, for  every history  h  for which  ta7  i2)(C(h))  >  0,  oh  is  an 
e-best response  to a2lh. Similarly  for BR-(Cr2). 
3. THE CONFLICT  BETWEEN  PREDICTION  AND OPTIMIZATION 
3.1. Conventionality  and Neutrality 
Let  X1  c X1 denote the set of Player l's strategies that are, for want of a 
better term, conventional.  For motivation, see  Section 1.2.2. Similarly,  the 
conventional  strategies  for Player 2 are X2  C X2. The joint conventional  set is 
X1 X X2. Restrict  attention  to conventional  sets that are not empty: Xi  0. 
As discussed  in Section 1.2.2,  I wish to confine  attention  to joint conventional 
sets that are neutral.  The definition  of neutrality,  given  below,  will be in terms  of 
a  function  '  that  assigns joint  conventional sets  to  repeated games. To 
formalize the domain of  I,  begin by fixing a set  A  of finite action sets. I 
interpret  A as the universe  of possible  action sets. For any set K, let #K denote 
the cardinality  of K. Assume that 0  OA (a player  always  has at least one action 
in any game) and that, for any action sets A, A'  I  A, if #A < #A' then there is 
an A* EA such that #A* = #A  and A* cA'.  Take A to be the same for both 
players.  Let G be the set of possible finite games using action sets drawn  from 
A and let  X  be the associated  power set of the set of possible repeated game 
strategies. 
Let 'i:  G x [0,1) --  X satisfy Wi(G,  8) c Xi(A1,  A2), where (A1, A2) are the 
action sets of G. I interpret  Wi(G,  8) as the conventional  set for player i in the 
repeated  game with stage game G and discount  factor 8. Assume Wi(G,  8) # 0. 
Let I!:  G x [0,1) -  xX  be defined by W(G, 8) = W1(G,  8)  x W2(G,  8). 
The following  constructions  will be used in the formal  definition  of neutrality. 
First, for each i,  let  Ai, A'i  eA  be  action sets with #Ai =  #A'.  I permit 
Ai =A'  as one possibility. Let X=ZA1,  A),  t'  =(AA,  A'2),  X1  = Xi(A,  A), 
and Xi'  = Xi(A'2,  A'2).  For each i, let gi: Ai -A'i  be any  bijection.  The bijections 
gi induce bijections, gi:  A(A ) --  A(Ai)',  f: X'--  , and yi: Xi 
-  li',  defined as 
follows. gi is defined by the property  that, for any aci  E A(Ai), for any ai EA  i, 
gi( ai) assigns  the same probability  to gi(ai) that ai does to ai. I  is defined  by 
the property  that, for any T, for any h EXT,  tb(h)  E(=  PT  and, for any t < T, if 
the t coordinate of h is (al,  a2),  then the t coordinate of  t(h)  is (g1(a1),  g2(a2)). 
19  Lehrer  and Sorin  (1994)  introduces  the concept  of  s-consistent  equilibrium,  based on the same 
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(In the special case of the null history,  (h0) =  h.)  yi  is defined by, for any 
rEE  Xi, for any h' s  ', 
'y(cr)(h')  = gi(of(Q-l(h'))). 
Informally,  yi(cr) is the strategy  in  Xi' that is equivalent  to  Cre  Xi once one 
translates  A(A ) into  A(A')  and  "  into k'. 
Next, if A  =A'  for each i, then I will also consider,  in addition  to bijections 
gi,  functions  g!:  Ai -* Ai,  possibly not  1-1,  and  associated functions 
g:  A(A ) -  A(A ) and yif:  Xi  -  Xi. gi? is defined by the property that, for any 
ai E A(A ), for any at*  eA1, the probability  assigned  by g?(a1) to at  equals  the 
sum of the probabilities  assigned  by ai  to all ai e g?-1  (a*).  yi? is defined  by, 
for any cr  E Xi, for any h Es, 
yfNu)(h)  = g?(o(h)). 
Informally,  yi`(o-)  is identical  to a  except that,  whenever  oa chooses  a1,  yif(o-) 
chooses g ?(ad). 
Finally,  consider  any A (A.  Let {: A xA  -+A xA  be a bijection  on the set 
of action profiles.  Let  *=K(A, A) and let  X = X1(A,  A) = X2(A,  A). Then g 
induces bijections  t ;: Z  '*  and y  :  X --  X, defined as follows.  )  t  is defined 
by the property  that, for any T, for any h EApT,  b {(h)  (foT  and,  for any t < T, if 
the t coordinate  of h is (a, a'), then the t coordinate  of t ;(h)  is {(a, a'). (In the 
special case of the null history,  b '(h0) = h?.) y  is defined  by the property  that, 
for each ore X, for each h' es, 
Syc(cr)(h') = c:r(b  C-'(h')). 
Informally,  yc(cr)  is identical  to  ar except that, upon receiving  the history  h' as 
input, y (o-) first  translates  h' into b C(h'). 
DEFINMIION  4:  !:  G x [0,1)  -+  X  X  is  neutral iff the following  properties 
are satisfied. 
1.  3  depends on  (G, 8)  only through  the strategic  form of  G.  Explicitly, 
consider any two stage games, G =(A1,  A2,u1,  u2) and G' = (A1,A2, u, u2), 
with the same action sets. Then  '(G,8)=  '(G',8')  for any 8,8'e[0,1). 
Abusing notation,  write 3:  A xA  -  Xx  X  in place of 3:  G X [0,1)  XX  X. 
Similarly  for the coordinate  functions  3P. 
2.  !  is symmetric.  Explicitly,  the following  properties  hold. 
(a) Player  symmetry.  Consider any A eA  and define {:  A xA  -A  xA  by 
{(a, a') =(a',  a). Then, for any a e  !1(A,  A), yc(or)e  E!'2(A,  A). Similarly,  for 
any  o-e  E!'2(A,  A), y  (of) E 31(A, A). 
(b) Action  symmetry.  For any A1,  A'1,  A2, A'2  EA with #Ai =  #A'i for each i, 
for any bijections  gi: Ai -A',  for any oa  E 3!i(A1,  A2), y()  E  A 
3.  3  is invariant  to simple  changes  in strategy.  Explicitly,  the following  proper- 
ties hold. 
(a) For  any  A1,A2 eA,  for  any  functions g P:  Ai--Ai,  for  any  arE 
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(b) For  any A eA,  for  any bijection {:  A xA  -+A xA,  for  any  oce 
Wi(A,  A), y'(or) E  'i(A, A). 
4.  1  is consistent.  Explicitly,  for any A1,  A2, A'1,  A'2  eA,  Ai cA'i for each i, 
the following  properties  hold. 
(a) For any o e  1i(A, A),  there is a  cr' e  Ii(A',  A'2) such that o-(h)= 
o-  '(h) for every h e(AA,  A2) 
(b) For any cr' e  Wi(A'1,  A'2),  if o '(h) e A(A ) for every h e(A1,  A),  then 
there is a o-  c  Wi(A1,  A2) such that o-(h) = o-  '(h) for every h ec(AA, A2). 
5.  1 permits  pure  strategies.  Explicitly,  for any A1, A2 eA,  if o cP i(A1, A2), 
then there is a pure strategy  s in the support  of o  such that s E Wi(AI,  A2). 
A joint conventional  set  .1  X 22 will be called neutral  if there is a neutral 
map  !  such that XI x X2 is in the image of W. 
For the interpretation  of, and motivation  for, these properties,  see Section 
1.2.2. 
3.2. Conventional  Prediction  and Conventional  Optimization 
DEFINITION  5: Conventional  Prediction  holds for player 1 with belief cr21 iff, 
for any (_-1, u2)  E X1  X X2, player 1 learns to predict the continuation  path of 
play;  similarly  for player  2. 
DEFINITION  6: Conventional  Optimization  holds for player  1 with belief o'21 iff 
BRI(o,21)  n 11 * 0; 
similarly  for player  2. 
DEFINITION  7: Given e > 0, Conventional  Uniform  e  Optimization  holds for 
player  1 with belief 0c21 iff 
BR (or21)  nf1  #0; 
similarly  for player  2. 
These properties  were discussed  in Section 1.2.2 and Section 1.2.4. 
3.3. Main  Results 
Consider  any action a1 EA1 and define 
a2(al)  =  argmax  max u1(a',a2)  -  u1(al, a2)1 
a2eA2  al  eA1 
If the right-hand  side is not single-valued,  arbitrarily  pick  one of the values  to be 
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player 1 has maximal  incentives not to play a1. a2(a1) does not necessarily 
minimize player l's  payoff from a1. That is, it is  not necessarily true that 
42(al)  =  argmin,2  E A2U1(al,  a2)  =  argmax  2E  A2[-  ul(al,  a2)] 
DEFINInON 8: Given  any pure strategy s  e  S1, let  S2(s)  denote  the  set  of 
pure strategies  for player  2 such that,  for any s2 E S2(s2),  if history  h is along  the 
path of play generated  by (s1,  s2) (i.e. if  L(SI,S2)(C(h))  = 1), then 
s2(h)  = d2(sl(h)). 
The definition of  S1(s2) is similar. 
Thus, viewed myopically (in  terms of  period-by-period  optimization), s, 
chooses the wrong  action in each period against  any pure strategy  s2 E S2(s1). 
Let m1 be player l's minmax  value in the stage game: 
Ml =  mmn  max  [E(al, a2) U,(,, 
a2EA(A2)  a1eA(Al)  1(a1,  a), 
where E(a,  a2)ul(al,a)  is player l's  expected payoff from the mixed action 
profile  (a1, a2).  m2  for player  2 is defined similarly.  I will sometimes  make the 
following  assumption. 
AsSUMPTION  M: For player 1, 
max  ul(al,  a2(a,))  <iml; 
a1eA 1 
similarly  for player  2. 
This assumption  is satisfied  in Matching  Pennies, Rock/Scissors/Paper, Bat- 
tle of the Sexes, and various  coordination  games. 
A  strategy cannot be  optimal if  a  player can learn to  predict that its 
continuation  will be suboptimal  in some continuation  game.  As an application  of 
this principle,  the next proposition  records  that, provided  there are no weakly 
dominant  actions in the stage game, a pure strategy  s1 cannot be optimal if 
player 1 can learn to predict the path of play generated by (S1, S2)  for any 
E S2. The hurdle to a result of this sort is that, even if the player learns to 
predict the path of play, it can be difficult for a player to learn that he is 
suboptimizing  with respect to his opponent's strategy.  For example, a player 
might think that the low payoffs  he (correctly)  projects  for the near future are 
simply  the price to be paid for the high payoffs  he (erroneously)  projects  for the 
more distant  future.  The first  part of the proposition  assumes  away  this sort of 
problem by taking players to be effectively myopic. The second part of the 
proposition  allows  players  to have any  level of patience,  but imposes  Assumption 
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PROPOSITION  1: Suppose  that no action  for player 1 is weakly  dominant  in the 
stage  game G. 
1. There  is an -E  > 0 and a 8 E (0,1] such that,  for any  pure  strategy  SI  E S, and 
any 52  E  S2(S1)  if player l's  belief o2- allows player 1 to learn to predict  the 
continuation  path of play generated  by (S1,  S2),  then s,  is not a uniform e-best 
response  to o(2- for any E  E [0, -E)  and any 8 E [0, 8). 
2. If, moreover,  Assumption  M holds, then  there  is an -E  > 0 such that, for any 
pure  strategy  s, E S, and any  52  E S2(S1),  if player l's belief o2I allows  player 1 to 
learn  to predict  the continuation  path of play generated  by (S1  I2),  then  s, is not a 
uniform e-best response to o(21 for any E E [0, -E)  and any 8 E [0, 1). 
Similar  results  hold  for player  2. 
The next step in the argument  is to make the following  observation,  the proof 
of which is in the Appendix. 
PROPOSITION  2:  Suppose  that X1 x X2 is neutral.  For any  pure  strategy  s5 E  1, 
there  is a pure  strategy  52  E 12  such that, for any history  h (not just histories  along 
the  path of play), 
s2(h)  = 62(s,(h)). 
In particular, X2 n S2(S1)  # 0.  A similar result holds for player 2. 
I am now in a position to state and prove the paper's  main result. 
THEOREM:  Let G be a stage  game  in which  neither  player  has a weakly  dominant 
action. 
1. There  is a  8 E (0,1]  such that, for any 8 E [0,  8),  for any neutral  joint 
conventional  set  X1  x X2,  there is no belief o21 such that both Conventional 
Prediction  and Conventional  Optimization  hold simultaneously  for player  1. 
2. If, moreover,  Assumption  M holds then, for any 8 E [0,1),  for any neutral 
joint conventional  set X1  x 12,  there  is no belief o2- such that both Conventional 
Prediction  and Conventional  Optimization  hold simultaneously  for player 1. 
Similar  results  hold  for player 2. 
PROOF:  For the proof of statement 1, choose 8 as in Proposition  1. Suppose 
that player  1 has beliefs  72I  and that, for these beliefs, Conventional  Prediction 
holds for player  1. Consider  any o- E X1.  By Property  5 of neutrality  (I  permits 
pure strategies),  there is a pure strategy  s1 E  -X  with s, in the support  of 0i.  By 
Proposition 2, there is  an  S2-  2nS2(S1).  By Proposition 1, s, C BRI(o-2'). 
(Indeed, s, * BR-(of21)  for e  sufficiently  small.) By Lemma S, o-l  ?  BR1(o-2). 
Since o1  and 0i  were arbitrary,  it follows  by contraposition  that Conventional 
Optimization  is violated for player 1. The proof of  statement 2  is  almost 
identical.  Q.E.D. 298  JOHN H.  NACHBAR 
For the interpretation  of this result, see the Introduction,  Section 1.2.3 in 
particular. 
REMARK  3: The Theorem  is robust  to small deviations  from neutrality.  More 
explicitly,  because the proof of Proposition  1 relies on strict  inequalities,  one can 
show that Proposition 1 extends to  situations in which player 1 chooses a 
(nonpure)  strategy  o-l in a small open neighborhood  of some pure strategy  s1 
and player  2 chooses a (nonpure)  strategy  o02 in a small open neighborhood  of 
the strategy  s2 E  X2(S1)  where S2  iS defined  by s2(h) =  d2(s1(h)) for any h. Here, 
"open" means in the sup norm (uniform convergence)  topology.20  Using the 
extended  version  of Proposition  1, one can then establish  that the conclusion  of 
the Theorem continues to hold even if the conclusion of Proposition  2 holds 
only approximately. 
In particular,  the Theorem is robust to relaxing  Property  5 of neutrality  to 
allow for the  possibility that conventional strategies necessarily tremble.  A 
trembled  version of a pure strategy s,  is a strategy  0l  such that, after any 
history h,  o-1(h)  chooses s1(h) with probability  (1 -  qh)  and chooses some 
mixture  over actions, where the mixture  might depend on h, with probability 
qhe2l  Let i =suphE=q.  For q  small, 0l  will be close to s  in the sup norm 
topology.  It is straightforward  to show that if Property  5 of neutrality  is relaxed 
to  allow small trembles, then versions of  Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 
continue to hold and therefore the conclusion of the Theorem continues to 
hold. Of course, if players  are constrained  to play strategies  that tremble,  then 
one should demand only approximate,  in particular  uniform e,  optimization 
rather than full optimization.  I will address  this point in Remark  8 in Section 
3.4.1. 
A consequence  of the Theorem  is the following. 
PROPOSITION  3: Let G be a stage  game in which neither  player  has a weakly 
dominant  action. Suppose  X, X X2 is both  neutral  and at most countable. 
1. There  is a 8 E (0, 1] such that, for any 8 E [0, b) and any belief  or2-  that  gives 
weight  to all of X2, Conventional  Optimization  fails for player 1. 
2. If, moreover,  Assumetion  M holds, then,  for any 8 E [0,  1) and any  belief  o-2 
that  gives  weight  to all of  X2, Conventional  Optimization  fails for player  1. 
Similar  results  hold  for player  2. 
PROOF:  If players choose a strategy  profile in  XI x X2 then the belief of 
either player satisfies grain of truth. It follows that Conventional  Prediction 
holds for both players  (see KL, Theorem 3). The result then follows from the 
Theorem.  Q.E.D. 
20 The metric  for this topology  is d(oi, vi')  =  suP  h  e1aI(h)  -  oi(h)I, where 11  11  is the standard 
Euclidean  norm  (view  qj(h) E A(AI)  as an element of R#Ai). 
21 This  definition  of tremble  is fairly  general;  in particular,  it allows  for trembles  that are not i.i.d. LEARNING  IN  REPEATED  GAMES  299 
As an application  of Proposition  3, suppose that the  Xi are defined by a 
bound  on strategic  complexity.  I will focus on bounds  defined  in terms  of Turing 
machines,  which  can be though  of as computers  with unbounded  memory.  I will 
remark  briefly  below on other possible  complexity  bounds. 
Say that a strategy  is Tunrng  implementable  if there is a Turing  machine  that 
takes histories  (encoded in machine  readable  form) as input and produces  the 
name of an action as output.22  The Turing  implementable  strategies  are pre- 
cisely  those that can be defined  recursively,  where I use the term "recursive"  in 
its Recursive  Function Theory sense. Equivalently,  the Turing implementable 
strategies are precisely those that can be  defined by a finite flow chart or 
program.  The Church-Turing  Thesis, which is generally (although not quite 
universally)  accepted  within mathematics,  asserts  that recursivity  captures  what 
one means by "computable  in principle."  The set of Turing implementable 
strategies is  thus the  largest set  of  computable strategies. It  is  a  natural 
benchmark  for a  conventional set  that is  a  large subset of  the  set  of  all 
strategies. 
Turing machines, as usually defined, are deterministic  and so the Turing 
implementable strategies are pure. (Randomizing  Turing machines will be 
considered  in Section  3.4.1.)  Let ST c Si  be the set of pure strategies  for player  i 
that are Turing  implementable.  ST is countable.23  Therefore,  player l's belief 
can give weight to all of S'.  For computability  reasons, I will assume that the 
payoff  functions  ui are rational  valued  and that the discount  factor 8 is rational. 
PROPOSITnON  4: Let G be a stage  game in which neither  player  has a weakly 
dominant  action.  Suppose  X1  X X2  =  S 2f  X S2 
1. There  is a 8 E (0, 1] and an E >  0 such that, for any rational  8 e [0,  8), any 
E E [0, E), and any  belief  q2' that  gives  weight  to all of ST,  Conventional  Uniform  e 
Optimization  fails for player 1. 
2. If, moreover,  Assumption  M holds, then  there  is an e  >  0 such that, for any 
rational  8 e [0,1), any e e  [0, i),  and any belief ao  that  gives weight  to all of ST, 
Conventional  Uniform  E Optimization  fails for player  1. 
Similar  results  hold  for player  2. 
PROOF:  The result for optimization,  rather than uniform e  optimization, 
follows  from  Proposition  3 provided  ST x ST is neutral.  Verification  of the latter 
is straightforward  and is omitted. The extension to uniform E optimization  is 
immediate  once one notes that Proposition  1 is stated for uniform e optimiza- 
22A more  formal  treatment  of Turing  implementability  for repeated  game  strategies  can be found 
in, for example,  Nachbar  and Zame (1996). For general reference  on Turing  machines  and other 
topics in computability,  see Cutland  (1980)  or Odifreddi  (1987). 
23Ay  Turing  machine  has a finite description,  hence there are only a countable  number  of 
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tion and that, therefore, the proof of  the Theorem extends to  uniform E 
optimization  provided  X1  c Si (conventional  strategies  are pure).  Q.E.D. 
REMARK  4: Although  stated for Turing  implementable  strategies,  Proposition 
4 holds for any standard  bound on complexity:  any standard  complexity  bound 
generates  a joint conventional  set that is (1) neutral  and (2) at most countable. 
Hence Proposition  3 implies  that, for conventional  sets defined  by any standard 
complexity  bound, if player 1 has beliefs that give weight to all of player 2's 
conventional  strategies,  player 1 has no conventional  best response  or even, for 
E small, uniform E-best  response. In this sense, player l's best response will 
always  be more complicated  than the strategies  that are conventional  for player 
2. 
REMARK  5: For intuition  for Proposition  4, consider  the following.  Say that a 
belief o2j that gives weight to all of X2  C S2j iS Turing  computable  if there is a 
Turing  machine  that generates  the belief in the form  of an enumeration  of pairs 
of  probabilities  and Turing machine descriptions,  which I  will refer to  as 
programs,  with each strategy  in X2 implemented  by at least one program  in the 
enumeration.  If beliefs are Turing  computable  then, for any 6 >  0, there exists a 
Turing machine implementing  a  uniform E-best response. Indeed, one  can 
construct  a Turing  machine  that, after any history,  computes  a finite approxima- 
tion to the correct  posterior  belief, then computes  a best response  with respect 
to that approximate  posterior for some large truncation  of the continuation 
game. Because of discounting,  this best response in the truncation  will be an 
approximate  best response in the full continuation.  One can show, although  I 
will not do so here, that all the calculations  required  are well within  the scope of 
a Turing  machine. 
The problem  that arises in Proposition  4 is that a belief that gives weight to 
all of  X2 =  S2T is not Turing  computable  because there is no Turing  machine 
that will enumerate  a list of strategy  programs  such that every Turing  imple- 
mentable  strategy  is implemented  by at least one program  on the list. This is so 
even though  the set of Turing  implementable  strategies  is countable.  The proof, 
which I omit, is a variation  on the diagonalization  argument  used in Turing 
(1936) to show that the set of recursive  functions  is not recursively  enumerable. 
Since  beliefs that give weight  to all of S2T are not Turing  computable,  a Turing 
machine  has no way to update  beliefs properly,  even approximately,  after some 
histories.  As a result,  the method  given above for constructing  a uniform 6-best 
response  does not apply.  Proposition  4 verifies  that, for 6  sufficiently  small, no 
uniform  E-best  response  can be implemented  by a Turing  machine.  Another  way 
to view the same point is to recognize  that, by Kuhn's  Theorem,  having  a belief 
that is not Turing computable  is equivalent  to facing an opponent playing a 
strategy  that is not Turing  implementable.  It should  not be surprising  that, if the 
opposing strategy is not Turing implementable,  one may not have a Turing 
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3.4. Extensions 
3.4.1. Constrained  Rational  Players 
The analysis  thus far has implicitly  maintained  the hypothesis  that players  are 
free to choose nonconventional  strategies  in order  to optimize.  If instead  players 
are constrained  to play  conventional  strategies  (see Section 1.2.4  for motivation), 
then the  Theorem implies that, so  long as  Conventional  Prediction holds, 
neither player will be  able to  optimize. One might hope that, despite the 
constraint,  players  could at least uniformly  E optimize.  If this were true then a 
small modification  of the argument  in KL would imply  asymptotic  convergence 
to approximate  Nash equilibrium  play. 
Proposition  4 has already  exploited  the fact that if all conventional  strategies 
are pure, then the Theorem's proof, and hence the Theorem itself, extends 
immediately  to cover uniform E optimization.  Thus, for E small, so long as 
Conventional  Prediction  holds, the constraint  prevents  the players  from choos- 
ing strategies  that are uniformly  E optimal.  This does not, of course, prevent  a 
player  from choosing a strategy  that is ex  ante E optimal.  But, as illustrated  in 
Section 1.3, ex ante E optimization  per se  may not be enough to guarantee 
convergence  to Nash equilibrium  play. 
If, on the other hand, the conventional  set contains  nonpure  strategies,  then 
the proof of the Theorem does not extend. The difficulty  is that Lemma S is 
false for uniform E optimization:  even if a strategy  of is uniformly  E optimal, 
some of the pure strategies  in its support  may not be. Despite this problem,  if 
players  are sufficiently  myopic,  then the conclusion  of the Theorem  does extend 
for conventional sets consisting of  the Turing implementable  strategies, the 
benchmark  case covered  in Proposition  4, even if one modifies  the definition  of 
Turing  machine  to permit  access to randomization  devices  (coin tossers).24 
Let Xi/ denote the set of strategies  for player  i that can be implemented  by a 
randomizing  Turing  machine.  The proof of the following  proposition  contains  a 
brief description  of how randomizing  Turing  machines  are constructed.  Under 
that construction,  XT is countable.  Hence player  l's belief can give weight  to all 
of XT 
The proof is in the Appendix. 
PROPOSITION  5:  Let G be a stage  game in which neither  player  has a weakly 
dominant  strategy.  There  is a  6 E [0, 1) and an  -  >  0 such that, for any rational 
8 e [0,  8),  any 6  e  [0,-  ),  and any belief o2  that gives weight  to all of  XT, 
Conventional  Uniform  E Optimization  fails for player 1. A similar  result  holds  for 
player  2. 
24A randomization  device is distinct  from the software  used by actual computers  to generate 
pseudo random  numbers.  Since sufficiently  complicated  Turing  machines  are capable of pseudo 
randomization,  Proposition  4 already  encompasses  pseudo  randomizing  strategies. 302  JOHN H.  NACHBAR 
REMARK  6: The proof relies on  the  fact that  S'j  is  sufficiently rich in 
strategies that, for any oa E X[,  there is a strategy s'2 E S2T that is close, in the 
sup norm  topology,  to a strategy  s2 E S2,  where s2  is such that, after any  history, 
the mixture of actions chosen by ao  is maximally  suboptimal  (s2  is thus an 
element of S2(  o),  where the latter is defined  in the obvious  way).  The proof of 
Proposition  5 extends  to any subsets  of Turing  implementable  strategies  that are 
neutral  and rich in the above sense. For example,  it extends  to conventional  sets 
formed by the strategies that are implementable  by finite automata  (roughly, 
computers  with finite memory). 
REMARK  7: It is not known  to what degree Proposition  5 extends to players 
who are patient (8  is high), although  it does extend for some nongeneric  stage 
games, such as Matching  Pennies. 
REMARK  8: Although,  as already  noted, the proof used for the Theorem  does 
not generally extend to uniform E  optimization  if conventional  sets contain 
nonpure  strategies,  the proof does extend  in special  cases. In particular,  suppose 
that the joint conventional  set X1  x X2 is a trembled  version of a pure neutral 
joint set S1 x S2;  see Remark  3. Since strategies  in X1  are close, in the sup norm 
topology,  to strategies  in Si, and since the Theorem  does extend for S, x S2,  a 
version  of the Theorem  extends  for X1  x X2. Somewhat  more precisely,  one can 
show that there is an  -  > 0 such that, if Conventional  Prediction  holds, then 
Conventional  Uniform  E  Optimization  fails  for  any  e  [0,-  ),  provided  4  is 
sufficiently  small (recall from Remark  3 that 4 is the maximal  tremble). 
3.4.2. Boundedly  Rational  Players 
A boundedly  rational  player  is one for whom deliberation  is costly.  There is, 
unfortunately,  no consensus  as to how bounded  rationality  should  be modeled.  I 
will assume  that a bounded  rational  player  is essentially  a Turing  machine,  and 
that it is this Turing  machine  that formulates  a belief that fashions  a response. 
If a player  is a Turing  machine,  then his belief will (almost by definition)  be 
computable.  As noted in Remark  5, this implies  that each player  will be able to 
uniformly  E  optimize. As also noted in Remark 5, since a player's  belief is 
computable, the  belief cannot give weight to  all of  his opponent's Turing 
implementable  strategies.  For example,  the belief might  assign  positive  probabil- 
ity only to opposing strategies that are implementable  by a finite automaton. 
Define the conventional set for player i  to  be  the  strategies to which his 
opponent  assigns  positive  probability. 
If the joint conventional  set is neutral,  then a variant  of Proposition  4 (or, if 
randomization  is permitted,  of Proposition  5, provided  conventional  sets are 
sufficiently  rich in the sense discussed  in Remark  6) tells us that, for 6  small, 
players  will choose nonconventional  (but still Turing  implementable)  strategies 
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If, on the other hand,  bounded  rationality  implies  that neutrality  fails, then it 
is  possible for  Conventional Uniform E  Optimization  to  hold even for  E 
arbitrarily  small. One might thus be in the ironic position of being able to 
construct  a theory of rational  learning  along the lines proposed  when, but only 
when, players  are only boundedly  rational.  But a failure of neutrality,  in and of 
itself, does not assure  Conventional  Uniform E Optimization.  For Conventional 
Uniform E Optimization,  neutrality  must fail the right away,  excluding  certain 
strategies  but not others.  Exactly  which  strategies  will depend  on the game. It is 
not clear  why  bounded  rationality  would  imply  that neutrality  would  fail in a way 
that facilitates  Conventional  Uniform e  Optimization  rather  than impedes  it. 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF LEMMA S: Let 
a* 





2i  with the product  (pointwise  convergence)  topology.25  Consider  any sequence  of strategies  alk  k  XI 
such  that (a) a1k converges  to a*  in the product  topology,  (b) for any k, a0k  shares  the support  of 
a,, and (c) for any k, alk  agrees  with a,  except  for at most a finite  number  of histories.26  Because 
-* is not a best response,  and because V1 is continuous  in the product  topology,  there is a k such 
that a1k  e BR1(a2l).  Because  a1k  shares  the support  of aO, and because  a1k  agrees  with a,  except 
for at most a finite  number  of histories,  one can show  that there is an a  E (0,1] and a a'  Ee  X1 such 
that al  = aoUk + (1-a)a  '. Choose  any a' E BR1(o2l).  Then,  since a1k  i  BR,(a2l) and since a > 0, 
Vl(al,  a2l)  =  Vl(C'alk  +  (1  -a)al?,  a2l)  <  Vl(aal'+  (1  -  0al?,  a2l). 
It follows  that a, e BRi(a2l).  The proof  then follows  by contraposition.27 
25  Since the set of finite histories is countably  infinite, 21  can be viewed as the product  set 
A(A1),  where A(A1) is viewed as the unit simplex in R#*A.  Endow A(A1) with the standard 
Euclidean  topology  and endow  A(A1l) with the product  topology. 
26 In particular,  one can construct  such a sequence by enumerating  the finite histories  and, for 
each k, defining alk(h) to equal a,*(h) for each of the first k  histories, and to equal al(h) 
otherwise. 
27  The proof  exploits  the continuity  of VI,  which  follows  from  the fact that repeated  game  payoffs 
are evaluated  as a present  value. If payoffs  were instead evaluated  by limit of means, continuity 
would  fail and the Lemma  would  be false. For example,  consider  the two-player  stage  game  in which 
player  2 has only one action and player 1 has two actions,  Left, yielding  0, and Right,  yielding  1. 
Under limit of means, it is a best response  (to his only possible belief) for player 1 to play the 
strategy  "following  any history  of length t, play Left with probability  2',  Right with probability 
1 -  2-'." Under this strategy,  player  1 plays  Left with positive  probability  in every  period.  Thus  the 
pure strategy  "play  Left always"  is in the support  of this behavior  strategy  even though  this pure 
strategy  is not a best response. 304  JOHN  H.  NACHBAR 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  1: Let 
wl(al) =  max ul(a' ,&2(a1))  -  u(al,  2(al)). 
al cA  1 
wl(al) ? 0. Moreover,  wl(al) = 0 iff a,  is dominant  (weakly  or strictly).  Since, by assumption,  no 
action  is weakly  dominant,  wl(al) > 0 for all al. Let 
=  min  wl(al)  > 0. 
al eAl 
Let 
u  =  max  max  ul(al,a2), 
a1eA1  a2,EA2 
u1  =  min  min ul(al, a2). 
aleA1  a2 eA2 
Since  no strategy  is weakly  dominant,  i1 > u 
To prove the first part of the proposition,  choose 8  sufficiently  small that, under uniform c 
optimization,  player  1 acts to maximize  his current  period  payoff  (i.e. he is effectively  myopic).  In 
particular,  it will turn out that the argument  below goes through  for 6 > 0 and 8 E (0,11  such that, 
for any E E [0,-)  and any 8 E [0, 3), 
E <  Wi-  ,a [U1  _1  ]- 
Note  that such  -  and 8 do exist. 
Consider any pure strategy s,  E S1 and any S2 e  S2(s1).  Temporarily fix  q Ee  (0,1).  Suppose that 
player  1 learns  to predict  the continuation  path of play.  Then,  for any continuation  game  beginning 
at time t +  1, t > t(q, 1) (that is, 1  = 1), player 1 assigns  some probability  (1 -  q') > (1 -  q) to the 
actual  action chosen by player  2 at date t +  1. For specificity,  suppose  that at date t +  1, player 1 
chooses action a* while player  2 chooses action a*. Discounting  payoffs  to date t + 1, player l's 
expected payoff in the continuation game is then  at most 
8 
(1 -  7q')ui(a*, a2*)  + 77'U1  +  U1ii.  1 - 
If player 1 were instead to choose an action a1 in period t + 1 to maximize  ul(al, a*), his 
expected payoff in the continuation game would be  at least 
(1 -  ') max  u1(al,  a*)  +  f'uj  +  -  u. 
Thus,  uniform  E optimization  requires 
8  ~~~~~~~~~8 
+  (1 -  i7f)ui(a*, a*)  +  q'Fij +  1-  _8Z1  2  (1 -  71)  max  ul(al,  a*)  + i1w_u  +  1 8-ul 
or 
1-8  E +  71'Fi U-  u1)  2W  wi  _  Pia  _1] 
where I have used the fact that, since  S2 E S2(s1),  maxa.  s Al  u1(a1, a*)  -  U1(a*,  a*)  =  w1(a*)  2  w1. 
By the construction  of 8 and 8, there is an i1 sufficiently  small  such  that this inequality  cannot  hold 
for any E E [0, 8)  and 8 E [0, 3).  This establishes the first part of the proposition. LEARNING  IN REPEATED  GAMES  305 
As for the second part of the proposition,  suppose  that Assumption  M holds. Fix any 8 e [0,1) 
and choose  E > 0 such that, for any c  (=0,  E), 
e < -3-ml  -  maxula,i2a)  1-  8  aleA1  j 
By Assumption  M, ml > maxa1e A,  ul(al,&2(ad)),  hence such e  exist. 
Once again,  consider  any pure strategy  s, E S1 and any  S2 E S2(sl). Temporarily  fix 1 > 0 and an 
integer 1  > 0. Suppose  that player 1 learns to predict  the continuation  path of play.  Then, for any 
continuation  game  beginning  at time t + 1,  t > t(i1, 1),  player  1 assigns  some probability  (1 -  1')  > (1 
-  q) to the actual I-period  continuation  history  beginning  at date t +  1. In that finite  continuation 
history,  player  1 receives  at most maxal e A,  u,(a,, d2(al)) per period.  On the other hand,  player  1 
believes  that there is a probability  iq' that the continuation  history  might  be something  else. In an 
alternate  i-period  continuation  history,  player  1 could receive at most UlI  per period.  Finally,  from 
date t + I  +  1 onwards,  player  1 could receive  at most uI per period.  Thus beginning  at date t +  1, 
player 1 expects to earn at most 
-8 (1 -  q') maA ul(al2(al))  +  'u71  ]  +  _ ,  . 
In contrast,  any best response  must expect to earn at least ml, on average,  following  any history 




Thus  E optimization requires 
1- 8~~~~~~~~  1 ~~~  81  Ml1 
[(1-1  max ul(al, d2(al)) + q'l1  - 
1-8 L  ~a1eAl 
or 
e2  (1-  71-8[ml  -  max u1(al,a2(a1))1  8  +  (1  -  8)  ] 
By the construction  of -,  there is an (7,q  l) such that this inequality  cannot  hold for any s E [0, -). 
This  establishes  the second  part  of the proposition.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSMON  2: Consider  any  neutral  map I: A xA -* X  x I  such that  '(A1,  A)  = 
X1 X X2.  Consider  any  pure strategy  s1  E X1  = tI'(AI, A2). Let S2 E S2  be defined  by 
s2(h)  =  d2(s1(h)) 
for every  history  h. I will argue  that S2 E 12.  I begin  with the following  observation. 
CLAIM:  Consider  anyA EA. If crc  '1(A,A), then orc  E!'2(A, A). 
PROOF:  Define C: A xA -A  xA  by {(a,a')=(a',a).  By Property  2(a) of neutrality  (player 
symmetry),  'y (or)  e  YI2(A,  A). By Property  3(b) of neutrality  (invariance  property  (b)), yC(y (Or))  E 
I2(A,  A). Finally,  note  that  yC(y (cr))  =  ar.  Q.E.D. 
For ease of notation,  henceforth  let A1 = A, A2 = A'. 
Consider  first the special case in which A cA'.  By Property  4(a) of neutrality  (consistency 
property  (a)), there is an s?  Ec  I1(A',  A') such that s?(h)  = s1(h)  for all h eZA,  A'). By the Claim, 
s?  E V2(A',  A'). Choose g  A' -+A' to be the identity  and choose any function g2 :  A' --A', 306  JOHN  H.  NACHBAR 
possibly  not 1-1,  such  that g?(a) = d2(a)  if a EA. By Property  3(a) of neutrality  (invariance  property 
(a)), y?(so)  E IP2(A',  A').  By Property  4(b) of neutrality  (consistency  property  (b)), there is a 
strategy s' E IP2(A,  A')  such that s'(h) = yo(soXh) for all h E:AA,  A').  One can verify that 
s2 =S'  E 112(A,A').  The argument  for A DA' is similar.28 
Suppose,  on the other hand, that A ?A'  but that #A < #A'. Then one can extend the above 
argument  as follows.  By an assumption  made  when A was defined,  there exists a set A* EA  with 
#A* = #A and A* cA'. Let g1: A -*A* be any  bijection  and let g2: A' -*A' be the identity.  Then, 
by Property  2(b) of neutrality  (action symmetry),  y1(sl) E  11-1(A*,  A'). By Property  4(a) and the 
above  Claim,  there is an so E A!2(A',  A') such that so(h)  = y1(sIXh)  for any h E-*(A*,  A'). Choose 
g?:  A' -*A' to be the identity  and choose any function  g2 : A'  A', possibly  not 1-1, such that 
g9f(a)  = d2(a) if a EA*. By Property  3(a), y2(so)  E IP2(A',  A'). By Property  4(b),  there is a strategy 
s' c  A12(A*,  A') such  that s'(h) = yo(soXh) for all h Ec-(A*, A'). One can verify  that s2 =  Y2-1(S') 
The argument  for #A > #A' is similar.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  5: I begin  by sketching  how  a Turing  machine  can be made  to randomize. 
Recall that a Turing  machine  operates  by executing  a sequence  of discrete  computational  steps. In 
each such step, a standard  (i.e. deterministic)  Turing  machine  reads  one bit (consisting  of either a 0 
or a 1) out of memory,  consults  its current  state (a Turing  machine  has a finite number  of abstract 
attributes  called states), and then, according  to a preset deterministic  rule that takes as input the 
value of the bit read from memory  and the state, the machine  may alter the bit in the current 
memory  location, it may change its state, and it may move to a different  memory  location.  The 
customary  way to handle randomization  is to add to the description  of a Turing  machine  a finite 
number  of special  states corresponding  to one or more coins, possibly  biased.  If random  state f  is 
entered,  the machine  leaves its memory  alone but switches  with probabilities  p(Q): (1 -p(Q))  to 
one of two ordinary  states. For computability  reasons, p(Q)  is assumed to be rational. With 
randomizing  Turing  machines,  there is a subtlety regarding  whether the Turing implementable 
strategy  plays an action for certain after any history  or just with probability  1. For the sake of 
generality,  I will allow  for the latter.  Since the number  of random  states is finite  and since the p(  ) 
are rational,  each randomizing  Turing  machine  has a finite description  and so the set of strategies 
implemented  by such machines  is countable. 
Extend  the domain  of fl2  to include  mixtures  over actions  by player  1: for any a,1  E  (AI), 
d2(a1) = argmax  max ul(al, a2) -  Ea1ul(al,  a2)l 
a2 EA 2  a1 eA 1 
where Ealul(al, a2)  is player l's expected  payoff  from the profile  (a,,  a2).29  Similarly,  extend the 
domain  of wl, introduced  in the proof of Proposition  1, so that, for any a,1  E  (AI), 
w1(a1) =  max u1(al, d2(a1)) -  Ea1 ul(a1, d2(a1)). 
a, EA1 
wl(a1) 2 0. Moreover,  wl(a1) = 0 iff a1 is dominant  (weakly  or strictly).  Since, by assumption,  no 
action (pure or mixed) is weakly dominant,  wl(a1)> 0 for all  a1. A(A1) is compact and it is 
straightforward  to show  that w, is continuous.  Therefore, 
w1i=  min  w1(al)  > 0. 
a1EA  (A1) 
Finally,  let Ft and ul be defined  as in Proposition  1. Again, since no action is weakly  dominant, 
R1 >_1. 
28 Briefly,  if A DA' then, by Property  4(a) and the Claim,  there is an so  E IP2(A,  A) such that 
so(h)  = sl(h) for all h E:AA, A'). The argument  then proceeds  largely  as before.  The one potential 
obstacle  is the application  of Property  4(b),  which  requires,  for h c(-A,  A'), that  y ?(soXh)  EA' cA. 
This condition  is satisfied  since, by definition,  d2 takes  values in A'. 
29As before, if the right-hand  side of the defining  expression  for d2(al) is not single-valued, 
arbitrarily  pick one of the values  to be d2(al). LEARNING  IN REPEATED  GAMES  307 
Choose 8 sufficiently  small that, under uniform  E  optimization,  player 1 acts to maximize  his 
current  period  payoff  (i.e. he is effectively  myopic).  In particular,  it will turn out that the argument 
below goes through for ->  0 and  8 E (0,1] such that, for any E E [0, -)  and any 8 E [0, 8), 
E <  w  1~[Ui  -  l8[  _ 
Note that such -  and 8 do exist. 
Choose any al E X[  and temporarily  fix a rational  number  v > 0. I claim that there is a pure 
strategy  S2 Ee  ST with the property  that, for any history  h, 
(1)  (max  ul(al,  s"(h))  -  EOl(h)ul(al  s2(h)))  -  w1(o1(h))  < v. 
The claim  would  be trivial  if one could  set s '(h) = a2(o1(h)).  I will discuss  the reason  for not doing 
so when I show  that there is indeed  such an s5 E XT 
Temporarily fix  E E [0,  -),  8 E [0, 8),  and  q E (0,1).  Let  al  E NT  and S,  E S2T be as above. Since 
player  l's beliefs give weight  to all of  X2, which  is countable,  player  1 learns  to predict  the path of 
play  generated  by (a,, s'). In particular,  for  almost  any  path of play  z, for any  continuation 
game beginning at  time t + 1,  t > t(,q,  1,  z)  (that is  1  = 1), player 1  assigns some probability 
(1 -  71')> (1 -  71) to  the  actual  action  chosen  by  player  2  at  date  t + 1,  namely  s?(h),  where 
h = ir(z, t), the t-period  initial  segment  of z. Discounting  payoffs  to date t + 1, player  l's expected 
payoff  in the continuation  game is then at most 
(1-  'q')E,rl(h)ul(al,s  i(h)) +  i1'91  +  1- 
If player  1 were instead  to choose an action in period t + 1 to maximize  u1(a,,  s '(h)), his expected 
payoff  would  be at least 
(1-71')  max  u1(a1,s(h))  +  q'u1+  u. 
Thus  uniform  E optimization  requires 
E+  (1 -  q')E0,1(h)ul(al,  sj(h))  +  q'U1  +  1 _ 
2  (1 -  71') max  ul(a1, s2(h))  +  'q'U1  +  1  1 
a,1 eA 
or 
E +  W  (u1-_1)  2 (1-n  )w1  (1  n  )v  1 _ ^ (u1  )8 
where I have used inequality  (1) and the fact that wl(a1) 2 wl. By the construction  of  -  and 8, 
there exist v and q sufficiently  small such that this inequality  cannot hold for any E E [0,  -)  and 
8 E  [0,  a). 
It remains only to show that there is indeed a Turing implementable  strategy  s2' satisfying 
inequality  (1). To avoid bogging  down the paper in computability  details, I will only sketch the 
Turing  machine  construction.  Suppose,  then, that a,  is implemented  by a Turing  machine  M. Let 
v > 0 be as given above.  From M, one can show that one can construct  a new deterministic  Turing 
machine  MV  that does the following.  On input  of a history  h, MV  simulates  the action  of M on h. 
Every  time M randomizes,  the flow of its program  branches  in two. MV proceeds  by simulating  M 
along each branch  until M either  halts,  giving  the action  chosen  by the strategy  implemented  by M, 308  JOHN H.  NACHBAR 
or M reaches  another  random  state.  Proceeding  in this  way,  MV can calculate  an approximation,  say 
al, to the true mixture  over actions,  say a, = oj(h). Set 
s2Mh  =  d2 (al'). 
By the continuity  of expectation,  and the definition  of wl, inequality  (1) will hold provided  a'  is 
sufficiently  close to a1. Since M has only a finite number  of random  states, the accuracy  of the 
estimate a'  improves  geometrically  with the depth of the simulation  (number  of times random 
states are hit).  Moreover,  since one can program  knowledge  of the p(f ) into MV,  MV will be able to 
calculate  whether  a depth  has been reached  sufficient  to ensure  that its estimate a'  is close enough 
to a  that inequality  (1) holds.  Therefore,  MV calculates  s?(h) in finite time. 
There are two reasons  to have MV approximate  a,  rather  than  to calculate  it exactly.  First,  if M 
chooses an action only with probability  1, rather than for certain, then MV may be unable to 
calculate a1 exactly.  In particular,  if MV  attempts  to calculate a,  by the above algorithm,  it may 
never  arrive  at an answer,  and so it may  fail to choose an action.  Second,  even if M always  chooses 
an action,  taking  an approximation  rather  than  computing  a1 exactly  is desirable  because  it reduces 
the complexity  of MV. In particular,  by taking  an approximation,  the number  of computational  steps 
required  by MV can be held to a multiple  of the number  expected  for M, and may  even be smaller 
than  the worst  case for M.  Q.E.D. 
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